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Carhart, Tom Lost Triumph: Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg û And Why It
Failed. G. P. Putnam's Sons, $25.95 hardcover ISBN 399152490
An Overarching Stratagem
The Confederate Battle Plan at Gettysburg
Will the battle of Gettysburg never cease to fascinate us? Is there a student
or historian of the Civil War û dead, alive or yet to be born û who hasn't, doesn't
or will not dream of writing some new breakthrough study on the so-called
Highwater Mark of the Confederacy? In William Faulkner's 1948 whimsy about
Gettysburg in Intruder in the Dust, there isn't a fourteen-year old Southern boy
alive for whom it remains just before two p.m. on that fateful third day of the
battle with all the guns laid, Pickett ready with his legion, everything awaiting
Longstreet to give the word. Its all in the balance, it hasn't happened yet, it hasn't
even begun yet but there is still time for it not to begin, suggested the famed
Mississippi literary genius. Retired army colonel Tom Carhart fulfills this
wishful thinking at its best. His new study suggests that Robert E. Lee had a
distinct plan to win the third day of the battle and that it could have been won.
He reminds us that each new generation revisits ad infinitum the question of
what if.
Carhart attempts to refute the long-held belief that Lee (one of the greatest
soldiers of all time, in his view) made a wrong decision in launching Pickett's
Charge to crack the center of George G. Meade's Federal lines on Cemetery
Ridge. Carhart suggests that using only twenty-percent of his total available
forces for a headlong rush across open fields and under withering enemy fire
(notwithstanding the preliminary depressant bombardment) was only part of a
distinct plan for that final afternoon of battle. The idea that two days of fighting
had tested the Yankee flanks and that one final push against the center would
fold Lee's opponent has long been a staple of the Gettysburg story. Carhart
believes that Lee intended Pickett's Charge to be simply part of a coordinated
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attack û the main thrust but with two supporting maneuvers, one of which was to
be the now-blurred, virtually forgotten role that J.E. B. Stuart's cavalry was to
play in a Napoleonic coup de grace Lee had studied the French Great Captain
earlier in his career and patterned the final hours of Gettysburg to fit the
masterful strokes of Jena and Austerlitz in Caphart's view. Of course, we have
long known that Pickett's supporting cast would come from flank commands,
and even those Confederates over at Culp's Hill would do their part to prevent
reinforcements from reaching Winfield Scott Hancock's embattled center of
Meade's position. But, the Stuart story is another matter, and here, Carhart brings
back into focus that lost element of the Gettysburg story.
Of course, in addition to Lee and Stuart, Carhart injects another character
calculated to sell well with the public. Carhart's contention is that Stuart's
directed move against the Federal rear area, by circling from the York road east
and south via little known country roads, was stopped cold by blue clad cavalry
principally under George Armstrong Custer. With Custer joining Lee and Stuart
for the plot, the only thing missing from a potential best seller then would be sex.
Yet, there is enough here otherwise to make for good reading and stimulating
discussion. Notwithstanding Carhart's aim to absolve Lee of culpability for
Pickett's disaster by suggesting that Stuart once more failed his leader and then
covered up that failure, the author also builds a persuasive case for a lackluster
Federal cavalry commander David Gregg standing aside as the audacious Custer
conducted a battle-winning, saber-swinging charge that stopped Stuart cold and
therefore thwarted Lee's plan for a coordinated assault on Cemetery Ridge. Here,
the book fails in the same manner as Lee's plan due to execution not concept.
Instead of in-depth, critical re-analysis of all possible sources, Carhart wanders
through repetitive writing, pans to his heroes and various byways of history.
Even then, Carhart and Professor James McPherson, who delivers a cameo
foreword, are dead wrong that past historians have neglected this part of the
Gettysburg story. If the meaning and pivotal nature of the cavalry action on what
the National Park Service styles East Cavalry Field have taken a back seat to
Pickett's suicidal story, that is as much the fault of the physical location of the
historical site and tourism as anything else. Certainly Professor Edward
Coddington explored Stuart's role and the resulting fight with Gregg and Custer
in The Gettysburg Campaign; A Study in Command (1968), pages 520- 523
as did retired lieutenant general Edward J. Stackpole twelve years before that in
They Met at Gettysburg, pages 278-283, for example. What Carhart
contributes then is the notion that Lee had a defined plan, entrusted its delivery
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to subordinates and was thwarted in its execution by those subordinates. In such
assertion, there has to be much faith, presumption and assertion via inherent
logic of how soldiers conduct battles rather than hard written evidence. Carhart
seems comfortable using such tactics, perhaps more so than most academics or
even laymen.
Carhart has a theme that warrants more extensive coverage and detail than
allowed by this book. Frankly, he wastes valuable space discussing ephemera
like the Mexican war, the causes of the Civil War, classical battles of history, the
combat arms interoperability of the Napoleonic era as well as operations in the
eastern theater leading to Gettysburg. This is a ten-chapter story (not the fifteen
of this book), at best. While perhaps never reaching seminal conclusions about
Lee, any plan that might have been afoot on the night of July 2/3, 1863 or how
events subsequently transpired for the defeat in Pennsylvania, such a study could
flatter Civil War historiography with an in-depth treatment of leadership,
planning and execution during those last pivotal hours of the meeting. Carhart's
study is by no means an unimportant new work on Gettysburg, to be sure. It
must remain a trade not a scholarly piece since it plays to glamorous characters û
Lee, Stuart and Custer to underscore points at the expense of more balanced and
probing analysis. Its' arteries are clogged with what a demanding editor could
have condensed into one chapter on what all had happened before Gettysburg in
the history of warfare. Still, Carhart can be praised for reviving a long neglected
element to a familiar topic. This corner of a forgotten field now stands about
where Faulkner would have it û the story still in the balance with still time for it
to be re-done in greater detail to satisfy the next generation of Americans
seeking resolution of the ghosts of the past. For Carhart, that undulating ground
east of the town of Gettysburg with the charging horsemen of Stuart, Gregg and
Custer û not Pickett's infantry miles away to the west -holds the key to such
resolution and another look at the famous battle.
B. Franklin Cooling, Associate Dean of Academic Programs, Industrial
College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Washington DC,
[coolingb@ndu.edu] has published numerous works in military and naval
history including Civil War studies of defending Washington and the
Kentucky-Tenessee theater of operations. His latest work Counter Thrust; From
the Peninsula to the Antietam will appear in the University of Nebraska series
Campaigns of the Civil War.
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